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Surviving Medical Device Preemption under 21 U.S.C. 360k: Clarifying Pleading
Standards for Parallel Claims Following Twombly and Iqbal.
Ashley Abraham*
I.

Introduction
Medical devices run the gamut on riskiness. Devices such as elastic bandages pose

almost no risk, while replacement heart valves, when malfunctioning, can be life-threatening.
Because they pose a greater threat, the riskier devices are subject to greater regulation by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) than those devices that are relatively safe.1 Some of the
most benign devices are exempt from review before being marketed, while most other devices
require only a premarket notification to the FDA through a relatively simple process called
510(k) clearance. 2 However, some devices are subject to a rigorous process of premarket
approval (PMA) under Section 515 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&CA).

3

Specifically, these devices are used to support or sustain human life or to prevent impairment of
human heath, or include those that present a potentially great risk of illness or injury.4
Almost paradoxically, manufacturers of the riskiest devices face a lesser chance of state
tort liability for defective manufacturing due to a preemption provision of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the FD&CA. According to 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), states cannot
establish any requirement for medical devices that is different from or in addition to
requirements promulgated by the federal government relating to the safety and effectiveness of
*
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the device.5 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,6 state tort claims
against manufacturers of 510(k) cleared devices are not preempted because the 510(k) process,
without more, does not constitute a requirement that “relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device” 7 since “the 510(k) process is focused on equivalence, not safety.” 8 In Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.,9 however, the Supreme Court determined that the preemption clause does apply
to PMA devices to the extent that the state regulations or tort claims hold manufacturers to a
standard that is higher than or different from that required by the federal government. 10
Therefore, as long the state requirements parallel federal requirements, the state tort claims
would not be preempted.11
Circuits have been split as to how to plead parallel claims with the added confusion of the
sufficiency of pleading standards set forth by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly12 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.13 These recent Supreme Court decisions urge plaintiffs to avoid conclusory allegations
while still alleging a plausible claim for relief. 14 In the context of PMA medical device
manufacturing defect claims, courts are divided regarding exactly which facts are sufficient to
properly plead a parallel claim and have established a spectrum of standards. These standards
range from extremely generalized pleadings to pleadings with great specificity regarding the
specific problem with the medical device that can be linked to the plaintiff's injury.
Additionally, since the state requirements must parallel federal requirements, plaintiffs must
allege that some federal requirement has been violated. The medical devices at issue are subject
5
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to both general controls, such as Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), as well as
device-specific PMA requirements. 15 While CGMPs are extensively described and readily
available to the public in 21 C.F.R. § 820,16 many of the PMA documents are confidential.17
Consequently, although plaintiffs may be able to allege that a specific CGMP has been violated,
specificity with regard to PMA requirements is less feasible.

Despite this inequality in

availability of documents, some courts are requiring plaintiffs to plead violations of CGMPs and
PMA requirements with great specificity, while other courts are more lenient.
The disparity in pleading standards will almost certainly lead to forum shopping between
the federal courts of appeals. Consequently, some plaintiffs may have no remedy at all if their
claims cannot pass muster under too stringent a standard. Conversely, too lenient of a test would
deprive manufacturers of the protection Congress intended to provide to them to encourage
medical device development under strict federal oversight. Since this issue relates to the riskiest
of devices, substantial injury with minimal to no recovery is not only possible, it is probable.
With stakes as high as these, clarification of the issue is not only necessary, it is urgent.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II will address the background and history of
medical device regulation and preemption of state law claims. Part III will discuss the differing
standards applied by the circuit courts. Part IV will analyze the issue of pleading standards and
propose a workable standard under which plaintiffs can plead parallel claims with the specificity
required by Twombly and Iqbal. The proposed two-step solution to the problem of varying
pleading standards would require plaintiffs first to ensure that their claims are not preempted by

15
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premising the claims on a violation of an FDA-mandated general or device-specific requirement,
and then to plead with as much specificity as is possible at the stage of judicial proceeding. If
the plaintiff’s claim is premised on a violation of general control, such as a CGMP, the plaintiff
should plead a specific violation. However, if the claim is premised on a violation of a PMA
requirement, great specificity may not be possible because all the PMA documents are not
available to the plaintiff. Thus, in assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, courts should take
into account the availability of federal requirements upon which the claims are premised.
Finally, Part V will summarize the proposed solution and conclude.
II.

Background
A. Evolution of Medical Device Regulation
The regulation of medical devices by the FDA was not always as stringent or extensive as

it today. In fact, although the FDA was created in the latter part of the nineteenth century,18 the
agency only gained jurisdiction over medical devices through the FD&CA of 1938.19 But this
Act merely prohibited adulteration and misbranding of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics
already on the market. 20 The 1938 Act also required a showing of safety for drugs through
premarket notification.21 In 1962, the FDA was given authority to review new drugs for safety
and efficacy through a premarket approval process.22 However, unlike with new drugs, the 1962
Act did not require new medical devices to obtain premarket approval from the FDA. 23
Recognizing that some high risk devices, such as surgical sutures, contact lenses and injectable
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Food and Drug Administration, About FDA: History, FDA.GOV,
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silicone, required a higher level of regulatory control, the FDA attempted to classify them as
drugs rather than devices.24
Throughout this time, the states, rather than the Federal government, regulated the
introduction of most new medical devices.25 However, the regulatory landscape began to change
in the 1960s and 1970s, as complex medical devices, such as the heart pacemaker, the kidney
dialysis machine and defibrillators, proliferated and some failed.26 Congress passed the MDA,
which initiated a regime of detailed federal oversight.27 The MDA added several provisions to
the 1962 Act, thus creating “a complex and novel system for regulating the development,
introduction, and marketing of medical devices.”28
B. Classification and Approval of Medical Devices
One of the major features of the MDA is its system of medical device classification.
Assignment to one of three classes is “based on the level of control necessary to assure the safety
and effectiveness of the medical device.”29 Devices in all three classes are subject to general
controls, which include “the basic adulteration and misbranding provisions as well as applicable
good manufacturing practice regulations, banned device regulations, and notification and repair,
replacement, or refund requirements.”30
Class I devices, such as elastic bandages and examination gloves, require the lowest level
of oversight because the general regulatory controls of the FD&CA are sufficient to assure safety

24

Hutt, supra note 1, at 976–77.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
26
Hutt, supra note 1, at 978; Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315.
27
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316.
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30
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and effectiveness.31 Class II devices include powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes, and are
devices for which general controls are not sufficient but enough information is available to
develop special controls. 32

The FDA establishes these special controls, which include

performance standards and post-market surveillance measures.33 Class III devices receive the
most federal oversight because general controls are insufficient to assure safety and effectiveness
and there is not enough information available to establish special controls.34 In general, Class III
devices, which include replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators and pacemaker
pulse generators, are used to support or sustain human life or to prevent impairment of human
heath, or they present a potentially great risk of illness or injury.35
The MDA also describes a system for introduction of medical devices to the market that
operates wholly independently of the classification system.36 There are three ways a medical
device can lawfully be marketed: (1) through premarket notification (PMN) to FDA under
Section 510(k) of the FD&CA; 37 (2) through a premarket approval (PMA) application under
Section 515 of the FD&CA;38 or (3) as an exempt device not subject to either the PMN or PMA
processes because it poses only non-significant risks.39
In order to receive 510(k) clearance of a device, manufacturers must simply demonstrate
that the device to be marketed is at least as safe and effective as, or “substantially equivalent” to,

31

Hutt, supra note 1, at 980; Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)).
Hutt, supra note 1, at 980; Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B)).
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a legally marketed device.40 Substantial equivalence is found if the new device has the same
intended use as the predicate device and has the same technological characteristics as the
predicate device.41 If the technological characteristics are different from the predicate device,
the manufacturer must show that the new device does not raise new questions of safety and
effectiveness and that the device is at least as safe and effective as the legally marketed device. 42
However, unlike the PMA process, 510(k) PMN does not require a safety and efficacy
assessment for the device to be marketed.43 Because it is the simplest, cheapest, and fastest way
to bring to market a new medical device that is not exempt from premarket review, the 510(k)
clearance process has become a key part of medical device regulation. 44 According to the
Institute of Medicine, about a third of all medical devices are cleared through the 510(k)
pathway, while the majority of the remaining devices are exempt from premarket review
(67%).45
In contrast, only about 1% of devices enter the market through the PMA process. 46 The
PMA process is very rigorous and requires manufacturers to submit what is usually a
multivolume application.47 The application includes, among other things:
full reports of all studies and investigations of the device’s safety and
effectiveness that have been published or should reasonably be known to
40

Food Drug and Cosmetic Act § 510(k); 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006); Food and Drug Administration, Premarket
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the applicant; a ‘full statement’ of the device’s ‘components, ingredients,
and properties and of the principle or principles of operation’; ‘a full
description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for,
the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation
of, such device’; samples or device components required by the FDA; and
a specimen of the proposed labeling.48
After reviewing the application, the FDA may grant or deny approval of the proposed medical
device, or condition approval on further research, 49 adherence to performance standards, 50
restrictions upon sale or distribution or compliance with other requirements as described by the
agency.51 The FDA may also impose device-specific restrictions.52 Once PMA is granted, the
manufacturer cannot, without permission from the FDA, make any changes to the “design
specifications, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, that would affect safety
or effectiveness.”53 Changes must be approved through a supplemental application for PMA,
which will be evaluated under essentially the same criteria as the initial application.54
C. MDA Express Preemption Clause, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)55
The MDA contains an express preemption clause, which provides the basis for
preemption of medical device state tort law claims. The clause states:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.56

48

21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.9 (2012).
21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006).
50
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Thus, the clause would prohibit state regulations and state tort claims against manufacturers of
medical devices if those claims are based on requirements relating to the safety or effectiveness
of the device that are different from or in addition to any federal requirements for the device.
In 1996, the Supreme Court examined the preemptive scope of Section 360k in
considering whether it applies to 510(k) cleared medical devices. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
defendant Medtronic notified the FDA of its intent to market a pacemaker lead through the
510(k) process. 57 The FDA found that device was substantially equivalent to a preexisting
device and cleared the marketing of the device.58 Consequently, the device was subject only to
general controls found in the Code of Federal Regulations.59 The FDA emphasized, however,
that the clearance “should not be construed as an endorsement of the pacemaker lead's safety.”60
Plaintiff Lohr, after being seriously injured by an allegedly defective lead, filed a
complaint against Medtronic alleging a negligent “breach of Medtronic’s ‘duty to use reasonable
care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the subject pacemaker’ . . . .”61 Defendant
Medtronic argued that Lohr’s claims were preempted by Section 360k.62 The Court found this
argument unpersuasive and held that the express preemption clause does not apply to 510(k)
cleared medical devices.63 In analyzing the preemption clause, the Court found that the 510(k)
process, without more, does not constitute a requirement that “relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device” 64 because “the 510(k) process is focused on equivalence, not

57

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996).
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 481.
62
Id.
63
Gregory J. Wartman, Life After Riegel: A Fresh Look at Medical Device Preemption One Year After Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 64 Food Drug L.J. 291, 294 (2009).
64
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2) (2006).
58
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safety.” 65 The Court noted that although the FDA may examine 510(k) applications with a
concern for the safety and effectiveness of the device, the agency does not “require” such devices
to “take any particular form for any particular reason[.]”66 Thus, unlike the more rigorous PMA
process, the 510(k) process does not provide any requirements relating to safety or efficacy upon
which to affix a basis for preemption under Section 360k, and state law tort claims against
manufacturers of 510(k) cleared devices are allowed.
Although tort claims against manufacturers of devices cleared by 510(k) were held to be
not preempted by Section 360k in 1996, the issue of preemption of claims relating to PMA
devices was left unanswered until 2008 when the Supreme Court decided Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc. There, plaintiff Riegel was allegedly seriously injured by defendant Medtronic’s Evergreen
Balloon Catheter, a Class III device that received premarket approval from the FDA. 67 The
district court dismissed Riegel’s tort claims on MDA preemption grounds.68 The Second Circuit
and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.69 In following its analysis in Lohr, the Supreme
Court decided the threshold issue of whether the PMA imposes a “requirement” that “relates to
the safety or effectiveness of the device.”70 The Court held that “premarket approval, in contrast
[to 510(k) clearance], imposes ‘requirements’ under the MDA as [it] interpreted in Lohr. Unlike
general labeling duties, premarket approval is specific to individual devices. And it is in no
sense an exemption from federal safety review--it is federal safety review.”71
After finding that premarket approval imposes “requirements” that are subject to
preemption, the Court addressed whether the plaintiff’s tort claims “relied upon ‘any
65

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 493 (1996) (citations omitted).
Id.
67
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008).
68
Id. at 320–21.
69
Id. at 321.
70
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
71
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322–23.
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requirement’ of [State] law applicable to the [device] that is ‘different from, or in addition to’
federal requirements and that ‘relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device.’”72 In other words, the Court had to
decide whether state tort duties constitute “requirements” under the MDA. 73

Using its

interpretation in Lohr, the Court posited that negligence and strict liability common-law actions
do impose “requirements” under the MDA and would be preempted by Section 360k.74 The
Court reasoned that “[a]bsent any other indication, reference to a State’s ‘requirements’ includes
its common-law duties.”75 Furthermore, “[s]tate tort law that requires a manufacturer’s catheters
to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal
scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect.”76 Drawing on its reasoning in Lohr,
the Court explained that “it is implausible that the MDA was meant to ‘grant greater power (to
set state standards different from, or in addition to, federal standards) to a single state jury than to
state officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes.’” 77 While
legislatures can at least be expected to apply a cost-benefit analysis, juries see only the costs of a
more dangerous design.78 Thus, of course common-law duties would be included in the scope of
preemption as would any state regulation or statute.79
The crux of the matter lies within whether these state common-law duties require
anything different from or in addition to federal requirements. Riegel left open a window for
some state-law based claims against manufacturers when it stated in dicta that “[s]tate
requirements are pre-empted under the MDA only to the extent that they are ‘different from, or
72

Id. at 323 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
Id. at 323.
74
Id. at 323–24 (alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 512 (1996)).
75
Id. at 324.
76
Id. at 325.
77
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 504) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78
Id.
79
Id.
73
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in addition to’ the requirements imposed by federal law.” 80 Therefore, the MDA “does not
prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA
regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.”81
Since common-law tort claims against manufacturers of PMA medical devices that
require anything different from or in addition to federal requirements are preempted by Section
360k, the question becomes, what types of claims are not preempted? Most circuits have agreed
that claims premised on violations of FDA requirements would not be preempted. However,
many circuits have dismissed claims at the pleadings phase because they have not properly
pleaded parallel claim. With little instruction from the Supreme Court in Riegel, circuits have
produced a myriad of standards under which to plead parallel claims.
D. Pleading Standards of Twombly and Iqbal
Because most manufacturers will try to dismiss claims at an early stage, plaintiffs will
need to know how to properly plead their parallel claims in accordance with Riegel’s
requirements. Adding to the confusion about how to properly plead parallel claims are the illdefined standards set forth in the two-pronged approach of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly82 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,83 which determines the sufficiency of pleadings to survive a motion to dismiss
in all civil actions, regardless of subject matter.84 Twombly and Iqbal urge plaintiffs to avoid
conclusory allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”85 Such
legal conclusions are to be disregarded, and the remaining non-conclusory allegations are
assumed to be true.86 The Court then requires that the remaining non-conclusory allegations
80

Id. at 330 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)).
Id. (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495).
82
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
83
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
84
Id. at 1953 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
85
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
86
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
81
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must have “facial plausibility [such that] the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 87
Plaintiffs must plead parallel claims with sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss in
accordance with these Supreme Court decisions and their imprecise standard of sufficiency of
factual content. The disparity between circuit courts lies within deciding exactly which facts are
sufficient to properly plead a parallel claim. Lenient courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have
held that a plaintiff must allege neither a specific federal regulation violation nor a specific
defect in the medical device.88 However, some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have held
that plaintiffs must allege both the federal requirement allegedly violated and the specific defect
in the medical device.89 This Comment will further examine the debate about whether either or
both of these holdings meet the pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.
III.

Circuit Splits: How Much Specificity is Enough?
A. A Spectrum of Standards
Circuits are split as to how to properly plead parallel claims against manufacturers of

PMA medical devices. While some courts allow for generalized allegations of violations of FDA
standards, other courts require plaintiffs to point to specific defects in the devices and specific
FDA requirements that have been violated. The following discussion of four representative
circuit court cases demonstrates the wide spectrum of pleading standards for parallel claims to
survive preemption under Section 360k.

87

Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
See e.g., Bausch v. Stryker, 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010).
89
See e.g., Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, 634 F.3d 1296, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2011).
88
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i. Lowest Standard: Plaintiffs Must Specify Neither the Federal
Requirement Allegedly Violated Nor the Defect
The Seventh Circuit, in Bausch v. Stryker,90 has established the lowest standard among
the circuits in parallel claim pleading requirements. In that case, plaintiff Bausch simply alleged
that manufacturers of the PMA approved Trident-brand ceramic-on-ceramic hip replacement
system (“the Trident”) “violated federal law” in manufacturing the Trident and brought this suit
under Illinois common law negligence and strict liability for a defective product.91 The district
court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the common law claims were
preempted. 92 However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that state law claims based on
violations of federal law are not expressly preempted by Section 360k.93
The court focused on the difficulties associated with requiring plaintiffs to plead with too
much specificity. With regard to alleging a violation of a specific federal requirement, the court
opined that “[f]or [Bausch] to plead with any more detail that her claims were ‘based entirely on
a specific defect in the Trident that existed outside the knowledge and regulations of the FDA,’
she would need access to the confidential materials in the [PMA] application setting forth the
medical device’s specifications.”94 The court found that because some of the PMA documents
are confidential, with “no public access to complete versions of these documents,” for plaintiffs
to allege specific violations would be simply impossible.95 The court also noted that allegations
of violations of general controls such as CGMPs were sufficient because many FDA regulations

90

Bausch, 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 549.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 552.
94
Id. at 561.
95
Id. at 560–61.
91
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that are not product-specific are still vital to producing safe and effective medical devices. 96
Thus, even though a plaintiff may not be able to allege a specific violation of the PMA
requirements because of the inability to access confidential documents, he or she can allege a
violation of the CGMP and successfully avert preemption.
The Seventh Circuit also posited that requiring plaintiffs to allege a specific defect in the
medical device would be unreasonable and too onerous because inspecting the device “outside of
a discovery process” to locate its defect “would risk charges of spoliation of evidence.”97 Thus,
plaintiffs are required to plead neither a specific federal regulation violation nor a specific defect
in the medical device.98
ii. A Little Higher: Plaintiffs Must Specify at Least the Federal
Requirement Allegedly Violated or the Defect
The Fifth Circuit, in Funk v. Stryker,99 has taken a slightly more restrictive approach than
the Seventh Circuit. This case, like Bausch v. Stryker,100 involved the Trident hip replacement
system. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff Funk’s claims because his claims did not
satisfy the “required pleading standards to set forth a cognizable claim[.]” 101 The plaintiff’s
complaint simply stated that the device contained a manufacturing defect because it was
manufactured in a way that violated “FDA standards and requirements” and “manufacturing
processes and design approved by the FDA.”102 The plaintiff also relied on the doctrine of res

96
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ipsa loquitur to allege a manufacturing defect.103 The court found the complaint “impermissibly
conclusory and vague” because it did
not specify the manufacturing defect; nor [did] it specify a causal
connection between the failure of the specific manufacturing process and
the specific defect in the process that caused the personal injury. Nor [did]
the complaint tell us how the manufacturing process failed, or how it
deviated from the FDA approved manufacturing process.104
Because the court found the complaint lacking in specificity with regards to both the
defect and the federal requirement allegedly violated, it is unclear whether both
specifications are required. However, it can be inferred that the Fifth Circuit requires at
least one or more of these elements.
iii. Even Higher: Plaintiffs Must Specify the Federal Requirement
Allegedly Violated and Perhaps Also the Defect
In In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation,105 the Eighth
Circuit examined manufacturing defect claims against the manufacturer of the Sprint Fidelis
Lead, a wire that helps an implanted defibrillator detect an arrhythmia and deliver a shock to
restore normal rhythm.106 Although the FDA granted premarket approval to Medtronic in 2004,
the company issued a recall of the product in 2007.107 Thereafter, the FDA announced a Class I
recall of the device.108 Several patients implanted with the device filed a consolidated complaint
against Medtronic alleging failure to warn, design defect and manufacturing defect claims. 109
The court found that the failure to warn claim was exactly what was preempted by Section 360k
because it required the manufacturer to provide warnings in addition to the ones required by the
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FDA’s PMA application approval. 110 The court also found that the design defect claim was
preempted by Section 360k because it was a direct attack on the FDA’s approval of the design,
and thus, would hold the manufacturer to a higher standard than that required by the FDA.111
With regard to the manufacturing defect claim, the district court dismissed the claim,
holding that a claim premised on a violation of CGMPs was insufficient to overcome preemption
under Section 360k.112 According to the district court, CGMPs are too general to qualify as a
specific federal requirement under the MDA unlike specific requirements in the PMA for the
Sprint Fidelis Leads.113 On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs asserted that requiring
them to allege a specific violation of the PMA was an impossible standard because of their
limited access to the confidential PMA documents before discovery. 114 The Eighth Circuit
conceded that this argument may be compelling, but found it did not apply in this case because
plaintiffs disclaimed the need for discovery to be better able to identify a specific federal
requirement that Medtronic allegedly violated when manufacturing the leads. 115 However, in
affirming the dismissal, the Eighth Circuit did not explicitly affirm the district court’s reasoning
regarding the insufficiency of claims based on violations of CGMPs to overcome preemption
under Section 360k.
The plaintiffs also based their claim on the allegation that all Sprint Fidelis Leads have an
unreasonably high risk of failure because of their use of unreliable spot welding.116 However,
the FDA actually approved the use of spot welding in a PMA Supplement.117 Thus, the court
held that as pleaded and argued the manufacturing defect claims were not parallel to federal
110
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requirements, but rather a direct attack on the FDA’s decision to approve the PMA
Supplement. 118 Therefore, as with the design defect claims, the Eighth Circuit held that
manufacturing defect claims were preempted because direct attacks on the FDA’s approval of
the device would hold the manufacturer to a higher standard than that required by the FDA.119
Essentially, the Eighth Circuit held that the “[p]laintiffs simply failed to adequately plead
that Medtronic violated a federal requirement specific to the FDA's PMA approval of this Class
III device.”120 Thus, it seems that, at a minimum, the Eighth Circuit would require plaintiffs to
point to a specific federal requirement. And when faced with a hypothetical in which the
plaintiff, without discovery, could not know the exact defect in the device, the court merely
opined that courts must “exercise care in applying Riegel's parallel claim principle at the
pleading stage[.]”121 Therefore, it is unclear whether the Eighth Circuit would require plaintiffs
to allege a specific defect.
iv. Highest Standard: Plaintiffs Must Specify Both the Federal
Requirement Allegedly Violated and the Defect
In Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International,122 the Eleventh Circuit established the strictest
pleading standard on the spectrum by requiring plaintiffs to allege both the federal requirement
allegedly violated and the specific defect in the medical device. 123 Plaintiff Wolicki-Gables
alleged state law claims for product liability, negligence, vicarious liability, and loss of
consortium against Arrow, the manufacturer of a PMA approved implanted pain management
pump system. 124 The complaint alleged a failure to reasonably design the device, failure to
118
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reasonably manufacture the device, and failure to reasonably provide adequate warnings. 125 The
court concluded that the complaint was inadequate to properly plead a parallel claim because the
allegations did not “set forth any specific problem, or failure to comply with any FDA regulation
that can be linked to the injury alleged.”126
B. Irreconcilable Differences: Why These Standards Are Too Different to
Coexist and a Call to Unify the Circuits
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits stand on extreme opposite sides of the spectrum of
pleading standards, and the Fifth and Eighth Circuits stand somewhere in between. On one end,
plaintiffs do not have to allege either a specific defect or a specific federal requirement that has
been violated. On the other end, plaintiffs must allege both a specific defect and a specific
federal requirement. These differing standards are completely incongruous. Consequently, this
disparity between circuits leaves plaintiffs with uncertainty about how much they need to allege
depending on in which circuit they file their claims.

The disparity also leaves defendant

manufacturers with uncertainty about where and for what actions they can be sued. For the
reasons stated below, these incongruent standards should no longer coexist.
The Supreme Court should step in and unify the circuits for several reasons. First, PMA
medical device parallel claims usually involve substantial injury because of the nature of the
medical devices and the potentially high risks they pose.

Substantial injury could mean

substantial liability for medical device manufacturers. Early dismissal of cases under a pleading
standard too difficult to meet can leave injured plaintiffs without a remedy that Congress did not
intend to bar. However, allowing claims to go forward under too lenient a standard can deprive
manufacturers of the protection Congress intended to afford them to encourage medical device
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development under a system of federal oversight. Premarket approval is already a very rigorous
process and opening up liability for unsubstantiated claims may discourage manufacturers from
pursuing research and development of potentially life saving devices.
Second, the Supreme Court should seek to uphold the stated goal of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to promote the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”127 To a defendant manufacturer, this goal may signify early dismissal of a frivolous
claim. On the other hand, an injured plaintiff may find that pleading standards that require
intense investigation and alleging of facts that are far more specific than those required by the
forms provided in the Federal Rules themselves128 is unjust and contrary to the stated goal. This
is especially true where the facts needed to allege such specific violations are inaccessible to
plaintiffs before the discovery process.
Third, since there is such disparity in pleading standards between the circuits, there is
susceptibility for forum shopping. Given the choice, plaintiffs will choose the circuit whose
rules will be most amenable to them. Forum shopping can give plaintiffs an “opportunity to gain
an unjust victory in litigation or to achieve an unjust settlement.” 129 Under the principle of
specific jurisdiction, corporations are open to suit in a certain state “when the suit ‘aris[es] out of
or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum.’”130 Thus, manufacturers can be sued in
the forum where the plaintiff experiences injury after use of the medical device. Additionally,
“[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render
127
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them essentially at home in the forum State.”131 Forums that would come under this type of
general jurisdiction would include states of incorporation, principle places of business,
headquarters locations, and perhaps even sites with major factories. Consider all the different
forums in which Medtronic, Inc. could be sued: (1) any state where the plaintiff experiences an
injury; (2) Minnesota—Medtronic’s state of incorporation and location of its World
Headquarters; (3) California, Tennessee, Florida, and Washington—locations of Medtronic’s
main business units; (4) Texas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Colorado, Connecticut, Arizona, and
Indiana—locations of Medtronic’s research and development facilities, manufacturing facilities,
and distribution centers; and (5) Georgia and New Jersey—educational centers where medical
professionals learn how to use Medtronic’s products.132 At a minimum, Medtronic could be sued
in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. At
least four of these circuits have different pleading standards, and plaintiffs could certainly choose
the circuit that would be most favorable to their interests. Medtronic is only one of the many
medical device manufacturers that could be negatively affected by this strong susceptibility for
forum shopping.
To rectify the aforementioned evils, this Comment urges the Supreme Court to step in
and unify the disparate pleading standards.
IV.

Analysis: Disparate Pleading Standards and a Workable Unifying Framework
Although the Supreme Court has yet to offer a uniform standard, this Comment provides

a workable framework under which a plaintiff can shape his or her complaint against a
manufacturer of a PMA medical device.
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First, a plaintiff should decide whether the claims parallel federal requirements and are
consequently not preempted.

The best way to ensure that the claims parallel federal

requirements is to premise the claim on a violation of an FDA mandated requirement for the
device. In the context of devices that have received premarket approval, the FDA requires
manufacturers to follow both general controls and special device-specific controls. Recall that
general controls include “the basic adulteration and misbranding provisions as well as applicable
good manufacturing practice regulations, banned device regulations, and notification and repair,
replacement, or refund requirements.”133 Thus, it makes sense to base claims of manufacturing
defects upon violations of these general controls as well as special device-specific controls that
are described in a device’s premarket approval.
Second, violations should be pled with as much factual specificity as possible at this
stage of the judicial proceedings. The adequacy of factual content should be determined by the
two-pronged approach of Twombly and Iqbal. In these two cases, the Supreme Court opined that
courts should disregard mere legal conclusions that are not supported by factual allegations.
Then, looking at the remaining non-conclusory allegations, “assume their veracity” and ask
“whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 134 Facial plausibility is found
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”135 Plausibility is not probability, but it is
more than mere conceivability.136 Additionally, determining plausibility is a “context-specific
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task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”137
The two-pronged test of Twombly and Iqbal does not articulate any special accommodations for
situations where essential information to state a claim is simply unavailable at the pleadings
stage, such as access to complete versions of PMA documents.

However, this Comment

proposes that courts should use “common sense”138 and allow for a generalized statement that the
PMA requirements have been violated. Therefore, the specificity with which to plead violations
may differ between general and special PMA controls depending on how much information is
actually available to the plaintiff.
In light of the disparity of availability of information regarding general and device
specific PMA requirements, the following discussion will separately analyze the pleading
standards for claims based on violations of general controls and claims based on violations of
special controls as specified in the PMA files.
A. Claims Based on Violations of General Controls Such As Current Good
Manufacturing Practices
Manufacturing defect claims premised on violations of CGMPs should not be preempted
solely because CGMPs are general requirements and not device-specific, as was erroneously
held by the district court of In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability
Litigation.139 The court’s reasoning in that case was seriously flawed for several reasons. The
goal of tort product liability law is to protect the interests of injured consumers, and the goal of
Section 360k preemption is to not hold manufacturers to a higher or different standard than to
which the federal government holds them. CGMPs are part of the federal standards. It makes
little sense that just because CGMPs are not device-specific that a manufacturer cannot be held
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liable for violating them. This rule does not serve either the purpose of tort law or of Section
360k preemption.

Rather, in Bausch v. Stryker, the Seventh Circuit raised a compelling

argument: FDA regulations that are not device-specific are still vital to producing safe and
effective medical devices.140 For example, 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(e) requires manufactures to have
in place procedures to prevent contamination of equipment that could adversely affect product
quality.141 Although this is only a general requirement that applies to all devices, regardless of
how it came to market, a violation of this requirement could have devastating effects, such as
bacterial infection leading to sepsis and eventual death. Surely, protecting manufactures from
liability for these types of violations is not what Congress envisioned when drafting the Section
360k preemption provision.
Furthermore, as established in Lohr, manufacturers of 510(k) cleared devices are liable
for violations of general controls such as CGMPs. 142 The distinction between general and
specific requirements produced the exact opposite conclusion in Lohr that it did in In re
Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability Litigation. Lohr established that claims
premised on violations of general requirements are not preempted because general requirements
are not worthy of the protection that the PMA devices receive; unlike for PMA devices, the FDA
does not make a safety or efficacy assessment in demanding compliance with those general
requirements and does not require manufacturers to go through the rigorous PMA process.143
Thus, as with non-PMA devices, claims based on violations of CGMPs should not be preempted
by Section 360k.
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The second inquiry then is with how much specificity a plaintiff has to plead a violation
of a general control. A mere statement that CGMPs were violated should be insufficient.
Plaintiffs should allege that a specific CGMP has been violated that has led to the manufacturing
defect. Furthermore, CGMPs, unlike device-specific PMA regulations, are available to the
public in 21 C.F.R. § 820.144 The FDA has extensively described CGMPs in Subparts A through
O of 21 C.F.R. § 820.145 The content of these regulations include, but are not limited to, auditing
procedures, design controls, production and process controls, labeling and packaging controls,
and handling, storage, distribution and installation. 146

Plaintiffs can readily access these

regulations, which apply to all medical device manufacturers, through a simple search on the
internet. Thus, discovery, cabined or otherwise, is not necessary to allege which regulation the
manufacturer has violated.
B. Claims Based on Violations of Special Controls Specified in Premarket
Approval Files
Claims premised on violations of device-specific requirements contained in a PMA
certainly parallel federal requirements, and according to Riegel would be the subject of
preemption to the extent that the state tort duties are ‘different from, or in addition to’ the
requirements imposed by federal law.”147 However, if the duties parallel rather than add to the
requirements imposed by federal law, the claims would not be preempted.
The major issue with regard to PMA violations is with how much specificity a plaintiff
must shape his or her claim. Twombly and Iqbal urge plaintiffs to avoid conclusory allegations.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
144
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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”148 Therefore it would seem that a
statement that the PMA has been violated and has thus led to the plaintiff’s injury is insufficient.
Courts like the Eleventh Circuit would require plaintiffs to point to a specific PMA requirement
that has allegedly been violated.149 However, courts following the Seventh Circuit would posit
that pleading with specificity would be virtually impossible if plaintiffs do not have access to
complete versions of the PMA.150 There is definite validity to the Seventh Circuit point of view
because as the Code of Federal Regulations explains, unless previously disclosed to the public,
much of the information and data in a PMA are not available for public viewing. 151 This
undisclosed information consists of, inter alia, manufacturing methods and processes, including
quality control procedures. 152,153 If the very information upon which plaintiffs must premise
their manufacturing defect claims is undisclosed, how then can plaintiffs plead with specificity
that a certain PMA requirement has been violated?
Furthermore, a study of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Appendix of Forms reveals
that some seemingly bare complaints pass muster under the Twombly and Iqbal standard, namely
Forms 11 and 18. Form 11, a Complaint for Negligence, states in pertinent part, “[o]n --date--,
at --place--, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”154 There is no
factual allegation as to how the defendant drove negligently, whether he violated a certain
driving regulation, or what is considered negligent. Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
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courts,” 155 and as such, Form 11 must be accepted as sufficient. 156 Similarly, Form 18, a
Complaint for Patent Infringement, states simply that “defendant has infringed and is still
infringing the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using --electric motors-- that embody the
patented invention, and the defendant will continue to do so unless enjoined by this court.”157
This complaint does not allege how defendant has infringed the patent with any detail as to the
technology involved or whether the infringement is literal or by the doctrine of equivalents.
However, the Federal Circuit has affirmed that Form 18 is in line with the Twombly standard for
pleadings because it “give(s) the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” 158 It follows that a complaint for defective manufacturing of a PMA
medical device need not allege with great specificity the exact PMA requirement that has been
violated. A contrary rule requiring greater specificity for PMA device manufacturing defect
claims would be inconsistent with the examples given in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since the plausibility of a claim is governed by principles of “common sense,” 159 courts
should be lenient with regard to how much specificity they require for alleging a violation of a
PMA device-specific requirement. Common sense would advise that a plaintiff cannot allege
that which he does not yet know. Consequently, since he does not the contours of the devicespecific requirements in a PMA, he cannot allege that a specific requirement has been violated.
As long as a plaintiff can allege specific facts such as when he used the device, what was the
nature of the injury, and how the injury was related to the device, a statement like “a
manufacturing requirement in the PMA file of the device has been violated,” should suffice. An
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allegation of this type would be akin to a Form 11 or Form 18 statement regarding a defendant’s
conduct.
Moreover, although manufacturers may claim that a lenient pleading standard would
deprive them of the statutory protection Congress sought to afford them with the preemption
clause, this logic is severely flawed. Leniency in the pleading standard would simply mean that
the preemption question might have to get decided at the summary judgment phase of trial after
discovery rather than at the pleadings phase. The mere fact that Congress wanted state law
claims that are not parallel to be preempted does not mean it has to be done at the pleadings
phase. A more lenient pleading standard does not undermine preemption; it merely pushes the
question to after we have a chance to see what the evidence truly shows.
Thus, while greater specificity is required for alleging violations of general controls such
as CGMPs, less specificity should be allowed for alleging violations of device-specific PMA
violations. Anything greater is just not possible and would leave injured plaintiffs with no
recourse; this is simply not tolerable.
V.

Conclusion
Several circuit courts have applied different standards in determining whether a plaintiff

has sufficiently stated a parallel claim that will escape Section 360k preemption in light of
Twombly and Iqbal. Since variant standards can lead to forum shopping, unequal administration
of the law, and early dismissal of claims brought by seriously injured plaintiffs, this Comment
proposes a unified standard that should be applied to all parallel claims. As the Supreme Court
iterated in Riegel, state law claims that are premised that violations of FDA regulations would
hold manufacturers to duties that “‘parallel’, rather than add to, federal requirements.” 160 This
Comment proposes that claims premised on violations of both general and device-specific
160
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controls should pass muster as parallel claims. Furthermore, while Twombly and Iqbal require
plaintiffs to allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief,161 these cases do not stand for
the proposition that plaintiffs must be required to plead more facts than they can possibly know.
While plaintiffs would have complete access to general controls such as CGMPs because of their
public availability, many PMA documents are confidential and inaccessible to plaintiffs.
Therefore, courts should require plaintiffs to specify which general control has been violated but
show leniency with regard to specificity in allegations of device-specific PMA requirements.
Lastly, although not the focus of this Comment, there may be a role for the FDA and the
medical device industry in resolving the issue of specificity for claims premised on devicespecific PMA requirements. Since the major problem seems to be that many of the PMA
documents are inaccessible at the pleadings stage, in the interest of protecting consumers, the
FDA may promulgate regulations to mandate that these essential documents be made public in
order to preserve non-frivolous claims. However, in a society as litigious as ours, manufacturers
may not be so willing to comply. Consequently, an increase in potential lawsuits could stifle the
incentive for continued development of valuable medical devices.
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